### SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MANIP LATCH CNTL FMEA NO 05-61C-2001 -1 REV: 06/26/88

VEHICLE

EFFECTIVITY:

A5SEMBLY :PNL A8A2 (V082-730150)

:ME452-0102-7203

P/N RI P/N VENDOR:

OUANTITY

:ONE

CRIT. FUNC:

CRIT. HDW:

103 104

102 Х

Х D FHASE(S): PL OO X DO X LS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS

PREPARED BY:

DES B SEARS

REL H YEW

J COURSEN ΟΞ

APPROVED BY

REL ( QE

BY (MASA) /seles APPROVED

EPDIC RELOPINATION

EPOHC SSMT

ITEM:

TOGGLE SWITCH (2P2P) - MRL LATCH/RELEASE

### FUNCTION:

PROVIDES POWER AND CONTROL TO REDUNDANT SYSTEMS FOR RELEASE/LATCH OPERATION OF THE MANIPULATOR RETENTION LATCH (MRL) TO ALLOW DEFLOY AND STOW OF THE RMS. THE SYSTEM RESTRAINS THE RMS DURING ASCENT AND REENTRY. 36V73A8A2S6

### FAILURE MODE:

FAILS OPEN (ALL POLES), SHORTS TO GROUND

## CAUSE(S):

PIECE FART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PROCESSING ANOMALY "

## EFFECT(S) ON:

(A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE

- (A,B) FIRST FAILURE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO DRIVE THE MRL AND TO RELEASE/LATCH RMS.
- (C) FIRST FAILURE FAILURE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO RELEASE RMS.
- (D) FIRST FAILURE SWITCH FAILURE IN RELEASE POSITION OR LATCH POSITION AFTER DEPLOYMENT CAUSES INABILITY TO RESTRAIN RMS. SECOND FAILURE (LOSS OF JETTISON) - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO UNRESTRAINED RMS MOTION CAUSING STRUCTURAL DAMAGE.

### DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

(A-D) DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE REFER TO AFPENDIX A, ITEM NO. 1 - TOGGLE SWITCH.

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# (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST VERIFY MRL OPERATION BY PERFORMING RELEASE/LATCH REDUNDANCY TESTS FOR PORT MRL SYSTEM 1 AND 2. TESTS ARE PERFORMED FOR EVERY FLIGHT WITH MPH/MRL/RMS AND LRU REPLACEMENT.

# (E) OPERATIONAL USE PIN KIT CIRCUITRY PATCH MAY BE INSTALLED TO BYPASS FAILURE. IF REQUIRED, RMS MAY BE JETTISONED FOR SAFETY IF UNABLE TO LATCH TWO OF THREE MRLS OR EVA MAY BE PERFORMED FOR RMS TIE-DOWN. NO EVA EXISTS TO MANUALLY DRIVE THE MRLS FOR LATCH/UNLATCH OPERATION.